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Abstract
We deﬁne a language whose type system, incorporating session types, allows complex protocols to be speciﬁed by types and
veriﬁed by static type checking.A session type, associated with a communication channel, speciﬁes the state transitions of a protocol
and also the data types of messages associated with transitions; thus type checking can verify both correctness of individual messages
and correctness of sequences of transitions. Previously, session types have mainly been studied in the context of the -calculus;
instead, our formulation is based on a multithreaded functional language with side-effecting input/output operations. Our typing
judgements statically describe dynamic changes in the types of channels, and our function types not only specify argument and
result types but also describe changes in channels. We formalize the syntax, semantics and type checking system of our language,
and prove subject reduction and runtime type safety theorems.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Communication in distributed systems is typically structured around protocols which specify the sequence and form
of messages passing over communication channels. Correctness of such systems implies that protocols are obeyed.
Systems programming is traditionally performed in the C programming language. It thus comes as no surprise that
many attempts to statically check protocols are based on this language: safe control of stateful resources is achieved
via type systems that either run on annotated C programs [8,13], or on programs written in a type-safe variant of C
[18,19]. Another approach to prove properties of protocols or their correct implementation comes from the general
setting of the -calculus [26,32], and includes type and effect systems to check correspondence assertions [2,3,17],
the approximation of the behaviour of -processes by CCS terms [6,23,30], and session types to describe structured
communication programming [14,15,20,21,33,40].
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Session types allow the speciﬁcation of a protocol to be expressed as a type; when a communication channel is
created, a session type is associated with it. Such a type speciﬁes not only the data types of individual messages, but
also the state transitions of the protocol and hence the allowable sequences of messages. By extending the standard
methodology of static type checking for conventional languages, it becomes possible to verify, at compile-time, that an
agent using the channel does so in accordance with the protocol. Further properties, like authentication or data integrity
and correct propagation, may be statically checked by combining session types with correspondence assertions.
The theory of session types has been developed in the context of the -calculus, but until now, has not been studied
theoretically in the context of a standard language paradigm, despite a few contributions which bridge session types
and conventional languages. Session types have been used to add behavioural information to the interfaces of CORBA
objects [34,35] using Gay and Hole’s theory of subtyping [14,15] to formalize compatibility and substitutability of
components. Session types have also been encoded in the Haskell programming language [27]. The former does not
link the improved CORBA interfaces to actual programming languages; the latter does not address the correspondence
between a session-based programming language and Haskell. Very recently, Dezani-Ciancaglini et al. [9,10] have
proposed a minimal object-oriented language with session types.
Our contribution to the problem of structured communication-based programming in general, and the veriﬁcation
of protocols in particular, is to transfer the concept of session types from the -calculus to a multithreaded functional
languagewith side-effecting input/output operations.More precisely, we provide a static, decidable, discipline to ensure
that a protocol implementation—code in a programming language—is correctwith respect to its speciﬁcation as a (set of)
session type(s).
This shows that static checking of session types could be added to a language such as Concurrent ML [31] (at least
without imperative features) or Concurrent Haskell [28] (cf. [27]). More generally, it is our view that by starting with
typing concepts which are well-understood in the context of a theoretical calculus, and transferring them to a language
which is closer to mainstream programming practice, we can achieve a powerful type system which is suited to practical
programming while retaining the beneﬁts of a sound foundation.
The key technical steps which we have undertaken, in order to address the differences between a conventional
programming style and the programming notation of the -calculus, are as follows:
• The operations on channels are independent terms, rather than preﬁxes of processes, so we have introduced a new
form of typing judgement which describes the effect of a term on the channel environment (that is, the collection of
channel names and their types).
• We have separated naming and creation of channels, and because this introduces the possibility of aliasing, we
represent the types of channels by indirection from the main type environment to the channel environment.
In previous work [16], we have presented a language supporting typed functional programming with inter-process
communication channels, but we only considered individual processes in isolation. In [36], we addressed collections of
functional threads communicating via (session) channels created from shared names. Since we considered a concurrent
scenario, the type system, compared with the previous one, is more complex.
Here we introduce a type checking algorithm for the language, and present the proofs for subject reduction and type
safety.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we explain session types in connection with a progressively
more sophisticated example. Sections 3–5 deﬁne the syntax, operational semantics, and type system of our language. In
Section 6, we present the runtime safety result. In Sections 7 and 8, we discuss related and future work. TheAppendices
contain the proofs of all the results in the paper.
2. Session types and the maths server
2.1. Input, output, and sequencing types
First, consider a server which provides a single operation: addition of integers. A suitable protocol can be deﬁned as
follows.
The client sends two integers. The server sends an integer which is their sum, then closes the connection.
The corresponding session type, from the server’s point of view, is
S =?Int.?Int.!Int.End
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in which ? means receive, ! means send, dot (.) is sequencing, and End indicates the end of the session. Note that the
type does not correspond precisely to the speciﬁcation, because it does not state that the server calculates the sum.
We only use type checking to verify observance of the protocol, not functional correctness. The server communicates
with a client on a channel called u; we think of the client engaging in a session with the server, using the channel u for
communication. In our language, the server looks like this:
server u = let x = receive u in
let y = receive u in
send x + y on u
or more concisely: send ((receive u) + (receive u)) on u.
Interchanging ? and ! yields the type describing the client side of the protocol:
S =!Int.!Int.?Int.End
and a client implementation uses the server to add two particular integers; the code may use x but cannot use the channel
u except for closing it.
client u = send 2 on u
send 3 on u
let x = receive u in code
2.2. Branching types
Now let us modify the protocol and add a negation operation to the server:
The client selects one of two commands: add or neg. In the case of add the client then sends two integers
and the server replies with an integer which is their sum. In the case of neg the client then sends an in-
teger and the server replies with an integer which is its negation. In either case, the server then closes the
connection.
The corresponding session type, for the server side, uses the constructor & (branch) to indicate that a choice is offered:
S = &〈add : ?Int.?Int.!Int.End, neg : ?Int.!Int.End 〉
Both services must be implemented. We introduce a case construct:
server u = case u of {
add ⇒ send (receive u) + (receive u) on u
neg ⇒ send −(receive u) on u }
The type of the client side uses the dual constructor (choice) to indicate that a choice is made.
S =〈add : !Int.!Int.?Int.End, neg : !Int.?Int.End 〉
A client implementation makes a particular choice, for example:
addClient u = select add on u negClient u = select neg on u
send 2 on u send 7 on u
send 3 on u let x = receive u in
let x = receive u in code
code
Note that the type of the subsequent interaction depends on the label which is selected. In order for type checking to
be decidable, it is essential that the label add or neg appears as a literal name in the program; labels cannot result from
computations.
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If we add a square root operation, sqrt, then as well as specifying that the argument and result have type Real , we
must allow for the possibility of an error (resulting in the end of the session) if the client asks for the square root of a
negative number. This is done by using the constructor on the server side, with options ok and error. The complete
English description of the protocol is starting to become lengthy, so we will omit it and simply show the type of the
server side:
S = &〈add : ?Int.?Int.!Int.End,
neg : ?Int.!Int.End,
sqrt : ?Real.〈ok : !Real.End, error : End 〉〉
This example shows that session types allow the description of protocols which cannot easily be accommodated with
objects: a server invoking a method (ok or error) on the client, as opposed to the traditional sequence select a method;
send the arguments; receive the result.
2.3. Recursive types
Amore realistic server would allow a session to consist of a sequence of commands and responses. The corresponding
type must be deﬁned recursively, and it is useful to include a quit command. Here is the type of the server side:
S = &〈add : ?Int.?Int.!Int.S,
neg : ?Int.!Int.S,
sqrt : ?Real.〈ok : !Real.S, error : S〉,
quit : End 〉
The server is now implemented by a recursive function, in which the positions of the recursive calls correspond to
the recursive occurrences of S in the type deﬁnition. To simplify the theory we decided not to include recursive types
in this paper; the interested reader may refer to report [16].
2.4. Function types
We have not mentioned the type of the server itself. Clearly, it accepts a channel and returns nothing. If c is the
name of the channel, the input/output behaviour of the function is described by Chan c → Unit . When control enters
the function, channel c is in a state where it offers add and neg services. The function then “consumes” the channel,
leaving it in a state ready to be closed. In order to correctly control channel usage, we annotate function types with the
initial and the ﬁnal type of all the channels used by the function. If c is the (runtime) channel denoted by the (program)
variable u, we may assign the following type to server:
server :: (c : &〈add : . . ., neg : . . .〉;Chan c → Unit; c : End )
server u = case u of {add ⇒ . . . , neg ⇒ . . . }
Note how the function type describes not only the type of the parameter and that of the result, but also its effect on
channel c. It can also be useful to send functions on channels. For example, we could add the component 1
eval : ?(Int → Bool ).?Int.!Bool .End
to the branch type of the server, with corresponding server code, to be placed within the server’s case above:
eval ⇒ send (receive u)(receive u) on u
1 We often omit the empty channel environment on each side of the arrow, so that Int → Bool is short for ∅; Int → Bool ; ∅.
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A client which requires a primality test service (perhaps the server has fast hardware) can be written as follows:
primeClient :: (c : 〈add : . . ., neg : . . ., eval : . . .〉;Chan c → Unit; c : End )
primeClient u = select eval on u
send isPrime on u
send bigNumber on u
let x = receive u in code
2.5. Establishing a connection
How do the client and the server reach a state in which they both know about channel u? We follow Takeuchi et al.
[33], and propose a pair of constructs: request v for use by clients, and accept v for use by servers. In use, request
and accept occur in separate threads, and interact with each other to create a new channel. The value v in both request
and accept, denotes the common knowledge of the two threads: a shared name used solely for the creation of new
channels. If S is the type of a channel, the type of a name used to create channels of type S is denoted by [S]. Functions
server and negClient now receive a name of type [&〈add : . . ., neg : . . ., eval : . . .〉], as shown in the following piece
of code:
server′ :: [&〈add : . . ., neg : . . ., eval : . . .〉] → Unit
server′ x = let u = accept x in (server u; close u)
negClient′ :: [&〈add : . . ., neg : . . ., eval : . . .〉] → Unit
negClient′ x = let u = request x in (negClient u; close u)
Note that the same type for the shared name x is used both for the server and for the client; it is the accept/request
construct that distinguishes one from the other. This is also where we introduce the operation to close a channel:
accept/request creates a channel; close destroys it.
2.6. Sharing names
In order for a name to become known by a client and a server, it must be created somewhere and distributed to both.
To create a new, potentially shared, name of type [S], we write new S. To distribute it to a second thread, we fork
a new thread, in whose code the name occurs. 2 Our complete system creates a name x and launches three threads
(a server and two clients), all sharing the newly created name:
system :: Unit
system = let x = new &〈add : . . ., neg : . . ., eval : . . .〉 in
fork negClient x; fork addClient x; fork server x
Given the above implementation of server, one of the clients will be forever request ing x. Fortunately, it is easy to
extend the server to accept more than one connection in its life time:
server :: [&〈add : . . ., neg : . . ., eval : . . .〉] → Unit
server x = let u = accept x in fork (case u of . . .; close u); server x
2.7. Sending channels on channels
Imagine two clients which need to cooperate in their interaction with the server: one client establishes a connection,
selects the neg operation, and sends the argument; the second client receives the result. After selecting neg and sending
the argument, the ﬁrst client must provide the second with the channel to the server. In order to do so, both clients must
2 Alternatively, we may send the name on an existing channel.
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share a name of type ?(?Int.End ).End (called S below) and establish a connection for the sole purpose of transmitting
the server channel.
askNeg :: [〈add : . . .〉] → [S] → Unit getNeg :: [S] → Unit
askNeg x y = let u = request x in getNeg y = let w = accept y in
select neg on u; send 7 on u let u = receive w in
let w = request y in let i = receive u in
send u on w; close w close u; close w; code
It is instructive to follow the evolution of the state (the type) of channels c and d, connected to variables u and w,
respectively. After the execution of the ﬁrst line of getNeg, d has type S =?(?Int.End ).End; after the second line, d is
reduced to End, but c shows up with type ?Int.End; after the third line both channels are of type End, that is, ready to
be closed. By the end of the fourth line, we gather no more information on channels c and d, for they are now closed.
That is the sort of analysis our type system performs.
After sending a channel, no further interaction on the channel is possible. Note that askNeg cannot close u, for
otherwise the channel’s client side would be closed twice (in askNeg and in getNeg). On the other hand, channel w
must be closed at both its ends, by askNeg and by getNeg.
The remainder of this section deals with further issues arising from the interaction between types and programming.
2.8. Channel aliasing
As soon as we separate creation and naming of channels, aliasing becomes an issue. Consider the function below.
sendSend u v = send 1 on u; send 2 on v
Function sendSend can be used in a number of different ways, including the one where u and v become aliases for
a single underlying channel.
sendTwice :: c : !Int.!Int.End;Chan c → Unit; c : End
sendTwice w = sendSend w w
Clearly, our type system must track aliases in order to be able to correctly type check programs such as this. Our
approach is to introduce indirection into type environments. In the body of function sendSend, the types of u and v are
both Chan c. The state of c, initially !Int.!Int.End, is recorded separately.
2.9. Free variables in functions
If we write
sendFree v = send 1 on u; send 2 on v
then function sendSend becomes u.sendFree. In order to type sendTwice, thus effectively aliasing u and v in sendSend,
we must have 3
sendFree :: c : !Int.!Int.End;Chan c → Unit; c : End
sendSend :: c : !Int.!Int.End;Chan c → Chan c → Unit ; c : End
in a typing environment associating the type Chan c to the free variable u of sendFree. However, if we do not want to
alias u and v, then we must have
sendFree :: c : !Int.End, d : !Int.End;Chan c → unit; c : End, d : End
sendSend :: c : !Int.End, d : !Int.End;Chan c → Chan d → unit; c : End, d : End
3 We abbreviate ; T → (;U → V ;′);′ to ; T → U → V ;′.
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in a typing environment containing u : Chan d . Note how the above type for sendFree captures changes to channels
that are parameters (c) and to channels that occur free (d).
2.10. Polymorphism
We have seen that sendFree admits at least two different types, a share/not-share kind of polymorphism. Other forms
include channel polymorphism and session polymorphism. For an example of channel polymorphism, consider
sendTwiceSendTwice :: c : S, d : S;Chan c → Chan d → unit; c : End, d : End
sendTwiceSendTwice x y = sendTwice x; sendTwice y
where S is !Int.!Int.End . Here sendTwice must be typed once with channel c, and another with channel d. For an
example of session polymorphism (indeed a variant of sharing polymorphism identiﬁed in the previous paragraph), we
have
sendQuad :: c : !Int.!Int.!Int.!Int.End;Chan c → Unit; c : End
sendQuad x = sendTwice x; sendTwice x
where sendTwice must be typed once with c : !Int.!Int.!Int.!Int.End, and a second time with c : !Int.!Int.End. For sim-
plicity we decided not to incorporate any form of polymorphism in our type system.
3. Syntax
One aspect of the syntax of our language has not been illustrated by the examples in Section 2. Channels are runtime
entities, created when a request meets an accept . In order to deﬁne the operational semantics (Section 4) it is necessary
to distinguish between the two ends of a channel, represented by polarities. If  is a channel, its two ends are written
+ and −. Channels are not supposed to occur in a top-level program. When writing programs such as those in
Section 2, we use conventional program variables to denote channels. Such variables may then be replaced by actual
channels.
The syntax of our language is deﬁned formally by the grammar in Fig. 1. We use term variables x, . . . , labels l, . . . ,
and channels , . . . , and deﬁne conﬁgurations C, threads t, expressions e, and values v. We write p for a polarized
channel, where p represents the polarity. Duality on polarities, written p, exchanges + and −. The dual polarities +
and − represent the opposite ends of channel .
Most of the syntactic constructs for expressions have been illustrated in Section 2. Threads comprise stacks of
expressions waiting for evaluation (cf. [24]), possibly with occurrences of the fork primitive. Threads establish new
sessions (create new channels ) by synchronizing, via accept/request, on shared names. Shared names are no different
from ordinary term variables, but we usually use the letter n when referring to them. Conﬁgurations have four forms: a
Fig. 1. Syntax.
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single thread, 〈t〉; a parallel collection of threads, (C1 | C2) (we consider the parallel composition left-associative, and
usually omit parentheses); declaration of a typed name, (x : [S])C; and declaration of a channel, ()C. To support
type checking, we annotate name declaration with its type, and -abstractions with a channel environment as well as
a typed argument. A conditional expression, if v then e else e, together with its corresponding values true, false, and
datatype, Bool , could be easily added.
Declaration of a typed name has not been illustrated yet. It shows up during reduction of new expressions, and can
also be used at the top level to give a more realistic model of the example in Section 2.6:
systemConf = (n : [&〈add : . . ., neg : . . ., eval : . . .〉])(〈negClient n〉 | 〈negClient n〉 | 〈server n〉)
This conﬁguration arises during reduction of the thread 〈system〉 deﬁned in Section 2.6, but deﬁning it in this form, at
the top level, represents a situation in which the clients and server are deﬁned as separate components which already
share the name n.
The syntax of types is also described in Fig. 1. We deﬁne term types T, data types D, session types S, and channel
environments . The type Chan  represents the type of the channel with identity ; the session type associated
with  is recorded separately in a channel environment . In the process of reduction, program variables may be
replaced by (runtime) channels, implying that type Chan c may become, say, Chan +. Among datatypes we have
channel-state annotated functional types ; T → T ;, and types for names [S] capable of establishing sessions of
type S.
In Section 2 we used several derived constructors. An expression e; t (sometimes implied in our examples by the
indentation) is an abbreviation for let y = e in t , for y a fresh variable. Idioms like send (receive c)(receive c) on c
need appropriate de-sugaring into consecutive let s, making the evaluation order explicit. We sometimes “terminate”
threads with an expression rather than a value: a thread e is short for let x = e in unit . Recursive function deﬁnitions
must be made explicit with rec .
4. Operational semantics
The binding occurrences are the variable x in (; x : T ).e, in rec (x : T ).e, in let x = e in t , and in (x : T )C,
and the channel  in ()C. Free and bound identiﬁers are deﬁned as usual and we work up to -equivalence. We deﬁne
a reduction semantics on conﬁgurations (Fig. 3), making use of a simple structural congruence relation [26] (Fig. 2),
allowing for the rearrangement of threads in a conﬁguration, so that reduction may happen. Substitution of values for
variables is deﬁned as expected (Figs. 2 and 3).
R-Init synchronizes two threads on a shared name n, creating a new channel  known to both threads. One
thread gets + and the other gets −, representing the opposite ends of the channel. Rules R-Com, R-Branch,
and R-Close synchronize two threads on a channel : R-Com transmits a value v from one thread to the other;
R-Branch, rather than transmitting a value, chooses one of the branches in the case thread; and R-Close closes
a channel in both threads simultaneously. In each case, one thread has + and the other has −. R-New creates a
new name n, and records the fact that the name is potentially shared, by means of a (n : [S]) in the resulting con-
ﬁguration. The last four rules allow reduction to happen underneath restriction, parallel composition, and structural
congruence.
Unlike other thread models, the value a thread reduces to is not communicated back to its parent thread (the one that
fork ed the terminating thread). Such behaviour would have to be explicitly programmed by arranging for both threads
to share a channel and explicitly send ing the result back to the parent.
Fig. 2. Structural congruence.
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Fig. 3. Reduction rules.
Example 1. We follow the execution of thread 〈system〉 in Section 2.6. Types play no role in reduction; we omit them.
〈system〉 (1)
→∗ (n) 〈fork negClient n; fork addClient n; fork server n〉 (2)
→∗ (n)( 〈let u = request n in . . .〉 | 〈let u = request n in . . .〉 | 〈let u = accept n in . . .〉) (3)
→∗ (n)( 〈let u = request n in . . .〉 | ()(〈select neg on +; . . .〉 | 〈case − of . . .〉)) (4)
→∗ (n)( 〈let u = request n in . . .〉 | ()(〈close +〉 | 〈close −〉)) (5)
→∗ (n) 〈let u = request n in . . .〉 (6)
In line (3) we have two threads competing for requesting a session on name n. We have chosen the negClient to go
ahead; a new channel , known only to the negClient and to the server, is created. The client gets + and the server
gets −. In line (4) we have a typical interaction between two threads on a common channel. Similar interactions
continue until both ends of the channel are ready to be closed, in line (5). Once closed, structural congruence allows
to get rid of the terminated threads. The run ends in line (6) with the addClient still waiting for a server which will
never come.
5. Typing
The type system is presented inFigs. 5–7,where,′ is the pointwise extensionof,  : S, as deﬁned inFig. 1.Typing
judgements for constants are of the form ; v 	→ T , where  is a map from variables to types.Value judgements do not
mention channel environments, for values, having no behaviour, do not change channels. Judgements for expressions
are of the form ;; e 	→ ′; T ;′′, where channel environment ′ describes the unused part of , whereas ′′
represents the ﬁnal types of the channels which are used by expression e. Channels which are created by e appear in
′′. If c : S ∈  then we will have either c : S ∈ ′ if e does not use c, or c : S′ ∈ ′′ if e uses c and leaves it with
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Fig. 4. Duality on session types.
Fig. 5. Type checking values.
type S′, or neither if S = End and e closes c. For example
x : Chan c; c : ?Int.End, d : !Int.End; receive x 	→ d : !Int.End; Int; c : End.
Finally, judgements for conﬁgurations are of the form 	;;C 	→ ′ where ′ describes the unused part of .
The typing rules can be interpreted directly as a type checking algorithm, by reading sequents X 	→ Y as the
description of a function that performs a pattern matching on input conﬁguration, expression, or value in X, and
outputs Y. We restrict the type checking algorithm to top level programs, containing no channel values, hence no
channel bindings ()C. For these programs, a straightforward analysis of the rules reveals that no backtracking is
needed.
The splitting of the input channel environment in X (in most of the rules) should only be performed after the auxiliary
calls have been made. For example, for a goal of the form (;; receive v), we call the function on (; v), check that
the output is of form Chan . Then, we split if possible, and terminate as prescribed by C-ReceiveD or C-ReceiveS,
according to the type of  in .
The algorithm relies on the ability to create new identiﬁers (rules C-Accept, C-Request, and C-ReceiveS), as well
as to build a type S from type S (rule C-Request). The latter operation is straightforward from the deﬁnition in Fig. 4.
The presentation of the type checking algorithm, in the form of inference rules, follows a general pattern for type
systems involving linear types [38].
5.1. Type checking values (Fig. 5)
C-Chan says that a polarized channel p has type Chan p. The actual type (or state) of channel p is to be found
in a channel environment , in the rules for expressions. In C-Abs, the initial and ﬁnal channel environments of the
function body are recorded in the function type.
Lemma 4(2) guarantees that, in judgement ;; e 	→ 1; T ;2, 1 and 2 have disjoint domains, so that 1,2
is deﬁned and the overall transformation of channel types can be described by the function type ; T → U ;1,2.
5.2. Type checking expressions (Fig. 6)
Channels allow for the transmission of different kinds of values: for the purpose of type checking, we distinguish
between sending/receiving channels, and sending/receiving the remaining values (constants and functions). As such,
we ﬁnd in Fig. 6 two rules for receive and two rules for send , that can be selected based on the type for .
In C-ReceiveD, the preﬁx ?D, of the type for channel , is consumed, provided that we are receiving on a value
aliased to  (that is a value of type Chan ). In C-ReceiveS, we receive a channel, that we decided to call c; the type
of the expression is Chan c, and we add a new entry to the ﬁnal channel environment, where we record the type for c.
The rules C-SendS and C-SendD, for sending channels and the remaining values, are similar.
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Fig. 6. Type checking expressions.
In C-Select, the type for  in the ﬁnal channel environment is that of branch lj in the type for  in the source channel
environment. In C-Case, all branches must produce the same ﬁnal channel environment. This enables us to know the
environment for any code following the case , independently of which branch is chosen at runtime. The same would
apply to the two branches of a conditional expression. Rule C-Close requires that the channel must be ready to be
closed (of type End ). We remove the closed channel from the environment.
Rules C-Request and C-Accept both introduce a new channel c in the channel environment, of dual types
[14,20,21,33,35,40]. At runtime the two occurrences of c are instantiated by the opposite ends (+, −) of some
new channel . The dual of a session type S, denoted S, is deﬁned for all session types, and is obtained by interchanging
output ! and input ?, and by interchanging branching & and selection , and leaving S otherwise unchanged. The
inductive deﬁnition of duality is in Fig. 4.
Rule C-Val says that constants do not affect the state of channels. In C-App, the initial environment in the type of the
function must be present in the overall environment, and is replaced by the ﬁnal environment from the function type.
Rule C-New speciﬁes that the expression new S has type [S], denoting a name which, when shared by two threads, is
able to produce (via accept/request ) new channels of type S.
The most complex type checking rule is C-Let. The channel environment 1,′1 which is used when type checking
t consists of the channels (1) which are not used by e and the updated types (′1) of the channels which are used by
e. In the conclusion, the unmodiﬁed channel environment 1 ∩ 2 consists of the channels which are used by neither
e nor t. The modiﬁed channel environment, (′1 ∩ 2),′2, consists of channels which are modiﬁed by e but not by t
(′1 ∩ 2) and channels which are modiﬁed by t (′2).
Rule C-Fork requires that t1 and t2 fully consume all of the channels that they use, either by using them completely
and closing them, or by sending them to other threads. Of the initial channels in , some are consumed by t1 and the
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Fig. 7. Type checking conﬁgurations.
remainder, 1, are used to type check t2. Any channels remaining after type checking t2, i.e. 2, are returned as the
channels which are not used by the fork expression.
5.3. Typing conﬁgurations (Fig. 7)
Rule C-Thread requires threads to consume their channels, similarly to C-Fork. The rule requires, via a type
environment of the form x : [ S], that the only free variables in a thread are those standing for names, used to initiate
new sessions via accept and request . Type safety (Theorem 3) relies on this guarantee.
In rule C-Par, we type check C1 and feed the output 1, the unused part of , into another call, this time for C2. The
output 2 of the second call is the unused channel environment of the parallel composition C1 |C2 (cf. rule C-Fork in
Fig. 6).
C-NewN discards information on the bound name. There are two rules for channel creation. Rule C-NewB says that
both ends of a newly created channel must be used with dual types. Rule C-NewC means that a conﬁguration remains
typable if, during reduction, one of its channels is consumed (cf. [40] and the absence of the bottom rule).
Typability over arbitrary channel environments is not closed under reduction. For example, the conﬁguration
〈send unit on +〉 | 〈(receive −)unit 〉
is typable with=+ : !Unit.End, − : ?(Unit →Unit ).End, yet, it reduces to a conﬁguration (〈unit 〉|〈unit unit 〉) that
is not typable under any channel environment. Notice however that if C is the ﬁrst conﬁguration above, then ()C is
not typable because the types for + and − are not dual.
This observation leads us to consider only channel environments where the two ends of a channel are of dual types.
We call such environments balanced [15]. A channel environment  is balanced if whenever + : S, − : S′ ∈ , then
S = S′. The main result of this section says that typability under balanced environments is preserved by reduction; the
proof is in Appendix A.
Theorem 2 (Subject reduction). If 	;;C 	→ ′ with  balanced, and C → C′, then there is a ′′ such that
	;′′;C′ 	→ ′, and ′′ is balanced.
A previous work of ours [36] does not enjoy the Subject Reduction property, as pointed out in [9]. The problem
occurs when a thread is sent one end of channel while already possessing the second end. The system in this paper
ﬁxes the problem by working with polarized channels, allowing two distinct entries (+, −) for the same channel  in
a channel environment.
6. Type safety
In our language of functional communicating threads different sorts of problems may occur at runtime, ranging from
the traditional error of trying to apply a value to something that is not a function; through applying close to a value that
is not a channel; to the most relevant to our work: having one thread trying to send on a given channel, and another
trying to select on the same channel, or having three or more threads trying to synchronize on the same channel.
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In order to deﬁne what we mean by a faulty conﬁguration, we start by calling a -thread any thread ready to perform
an operation on channel p, that is a thread of the form 〈let x = receive p in t〉, and similarly for send , case , select ,
and close . A -redex is the parallel composition of two threads ready to communicate on channel , i.e.
〈let x = send v on p in t1〉 | 〈let y = receive p in t2〉
and similarly for case/select , close/close . A conﬁguration C is faulty when C ≡ (x : T )()(C1 | C2) and C1 is
(1) the thread 〈let x = vv′ in t〉, where v = y.e and v = rec (y : T )._; or is
(2) the thread 〈let x = accept /request v in t〉, where v is not a variable; or is
(3) the thread 〈let x = e in t〉, where e is (i) receive /close v, or (ii) send _ on v, or (iii) case v of _, or (iv)
select _ on v, with v not a channel; or is
(4) the parallel composition of two -threads that do not form a -redex; or is
(5) the parallel composition of three or more -threads.
Typability, per se, does not guarantee type safety. A conﬁguration containing one thread trying to send on a given
channel, and another trying to select on the same channel, can be typable. For example, the following sequent is
derivable with  = + : !Unit .End , − : 〈l : End 〉.
∅;; 〈send unit on +; close +〉 | 〈select l on −; close −〉 	→ ∅
Notice however that if C is the above conﬁguration, then ()C is not typable because the types for + and − are
not dual.
Similarly to Subject Reduction, we consider balanced channel environments only. The main property of this section
says that conﬁgurations typable in balanced environments are not faulty; the proof is in Appendix B.
Theorem 3 (Type safety). If ;;C 	→ ′ with  balanced, then C is not faulty.
7. Related work
Cyclone [19] is a C-like type-safe polymorphic imperative language. It features region-based memory management,
and more recently threads and locks [18], via a sophisticated type system. The multithreaded version requires “a lock
name for every pointer and lock type, and an effect for every function”. Our locks are channels; but more than mutual
exclusion, channels also allow a precise description of the protocol “between” acquiring and releasing the lock. In
Cyclone a thread acquires a lock for a resource, uses the resource in whichever way it needs, and then releases the lock.
Using our language a thread acquires the lock via a request operation, and then follows a speciﬁed protocol for the
resource, before closing the channel obtained with request .
In the Vault system [8] annotations are added to C programs, in order to describe protocols that a compiler can
statically enforce. Similarly to our approach, individual runtime objects are tracked by associating keys (channels,
in our terminology) with resources, and function types describe the effect of the function on the keys. Although
incorporating a form of selection (), the type system describes protocols in less detail than we can achieve with
session types. “Adoption and Focus” [11], by the same authors, is a type system able to track changes in the state of
objects; the system handles aliasing, and includes a form of polymorphism in functions. In contrast, our system checks
the types of individual messages, as well as tracking the state of the channel. Our system is more specialized, but the
specialization allows more type checking in the situation that we handle.
Type and effect systems can be used to prove properties of protocols. Gordon and Jeffrey [17] use one such system
to prove progress properties of communication protocols written in the -calculus. Bonelli et al. [2,3] combine the
language of Honda et al. [21] with the correspondence assertions of Gordon and Jeffrey, thus obtaining a setting where
further properties can be proved about programs. Adding correspondence assertions to session types increases the
expressiveness of the system in two ways. Although session types only specify the structure of interactions between
pairs of participants of a possibly multiparty protocol, the new setting makes it possible to specify and check that the
interactions between participants in different pairs respect the overall protocol. Furthermore, the integrity and correct
propagation of data are also veriﬁable. However, this is a different kind of extension of session types than our work;
their language does not include function types.
Rajamani et al.’s Behave [6,30] uses CCS to describe properties of -calculus programs, veriﬁed via a combination of
type and model checking. Since our system is purely type checking (not model checking) veriﬁcation is more efﬁcient
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and easier to implement. Igarashi and Kobayashi have developed a generic framework in which a range of -calculus
type systems can be deﬁned [23]. Although able to express sequencing of input and output types similarly to session
types, it cannot express branching types.
A somewhat related line of research addresses resource access in general. Walker et al. [39] present a language to
describe region-based memory management together with a provably safe type system. Igarashi and Kobayashi [22]
present a general framework comprising a language with primitives for creating and accessing resources, and a type
inference algorithm that checkswhether programs access resources in a disciplinedmanner.Although types for resources
in this latter work are similar in spirit to session types, we work in a much simpler setting.
Neubauer and Thiemann encoded a version of session types in the Haskell programming language, and proved that
the embedding preserves typings [27], but the results are limited to type soundness.
More recently, Dezani-Ciancaglini et al. [10] proposed a minimal distributed object-oriented language with session
types, where higher-order channels are not allowed. This problem is overcome in [9], whose type system also enjoys a
progress property, whereby well-typed programs do not starve at communication points, once a session is established.
The price to pay is the impossibility of interleaving communications on different channels, by the same thread.
The language in [9] extends a conventional class-based language with session primitives (including an interesting
receive-while primitive), rather than trying to integrate session primitives within the conventional OO constructs. To
ensure type preservation, the language presents strong syntactic restrictions so as not to allow channel aliasing, as
opposed to our system where aliasing is allowed, albeit in a (type controlled) restricted form.
8. Future work
We outline some of the issues involved in extending our language to include a wider range of standard features.
Recursive session types: Recursive session types have been used in a variety of works [16,40,21]. We feel its
incorporation in the present setting would not present major difﬁculties.
Polymorphism: The last part of Section 2 presents examples of polymorphic functions. A previous work of ours [36]
addresses polymorphism by using an untyped syntax and separately typing different copies of the polymorphic value
as proposed in [29, Chapter 22]. For type checking purposes, we use in this paper a typed syntax, hence a new approach
is needed. Channel polymorphism is easy to handle with a standard Damas–Milner (ML-style or let-polymorphism)
approach [25]. Session polymorphism remains an interesting challenge.
Web services: Our work opens up the possibility of an application of session types to veriﬁcation of web service
implementations [7,37]. Web services require a model for business interactions, which typically assume the form
of sequences of peer-to-peer message exchanges, both synchronous and asynchronous, within stateful, long-running
interactions involving two or more parties. Although some rigorous semantics have been developed (eg. [4]), there is
still little assistance with the veriﬁcation of the correctness of the protocol descriptions and their composition (e.g.
[5,12]). Session types may provide a useful static analysis tool.
ML-style references and assignment: This would introduce further issues of aliasing. We do not yet know whether
our present infrastructure for type checking in the presence of aliasing would be sufﬁcient for this extension.
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 2, Subject Reduction
We start with a few auxiliary results; the proof of Subject Reduction. To simplify the proofs, we make use of the
variable convention [1], allowing, for example, to assume that, in sequent 	 ()C, channel  does not occur in
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either 	 or , in any form, + or −. Relatedly, when we say that  does not occur in C, we mean that it does not occur
free in C and, by the variable convention, that it does not occur bound either, again in any c, +, − form.
We start with a basic result used in the proofs of both Subject Reduction and Type Safety.
Lemma 4. (1) If ;;C 	→ ′ then ′ ⊆ .
(2) If ;; e 	→ 1; T ;2 then 1 ⊆  and dom(1) ∩ dom(2) = ∅.
Proof. The proof of the ﬁrst clause is by induction on the derivation of the judgement, using the result for expressions
(clause 2). The proof of the second clause is by a straightforward induction on the derivation of the judgement. 
The following easy results allow to grow and shrink the variable environment of an expression. Weakening is used
in Subject Reduction (rule R-Let) and narrowing in the Substitution Lemma 13. 4
Lemma 5 (Variable weakening). Suppose that x does not occur in C, e, v.
(1) If ;;C 	→ ′ then , x : T ;;C 	→ ′.
(2) If ;; e 	→ 1;U ;2 then , x : T ;; e 	→ 1;U ;2.
(3) If ; v 	→ U then , x : T ; v 	→ U .
Proof. The proof of the ﬁrst clause is by induction on the derivation of the judgement, using the result for expressions
(clause 2). The proofs of the second and third clauses, by mutual induction on the derivation of the judgements, are
straightforward. 
Lemma 6 (Variable narrowing). Suppose that x does not occur in C, e, v.
(1) If , x : T ;;C 	→ ′ then ;;C 	→ ′.
(2) If , x : T ;; e 	→ 1;U ;2 then ;; e 	→ 1;U ;2.
(3) If , x : T ; v 	→ U then ; v 	→ U .
Proof. The proofs follow the pattern of the ones above. 
We repeat the above exercise, this time for channel environments rather than variables.
Lemma 7 (Channel environment narrowing).
(1) If ;,′;C 	→ ′′,′ then ;;C 	→ ′′.
(2) If ;,′; e 	→ 1,′; T ;2 then ;; e 	→ 1; T ;2.
Proof. The proof of the ﬁrst clause is by induction on the derivation of the judgement, using the result for expressions
(clause 2). The proof of the second clause is by a straightforward induction on the derivation of the judgement. 
Lemma 8 (Channel environment weakening).
(1) If ;;C 	→ ′ then ;,′′;C 	→ ′,′′.
(2) If ;; e 	→ 1; T ;2 then ;,′; e 	→ 1,′; T ;2.
Proof. The proofs follow the pattern of the ones above. 
The following two results allow to conclude that channels in the domain of a channel environment occur free in a
conﬁguration. It is needed in Subject Congruence (channel extrusion using rule C-NewB).
Lemma 9 (Free channels in expressions).
(1) If ;; e 	→ 1;Chan p;2 and  does not contain Chan p then p occurs free in e.
(2) If ;, p : S; e 	→ 1; T ;2 and  does not contain Chan p and p : S ∈ 1 then p occurs free in e.
4 In the formulation of the lemma, we have omitted the hypothesis that x is not in the domain of  (for otherwise , x : T would not be deﬁned
in the conclusion). We henceforth follow this convention for all sorts of environments.
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Proof. Straightforward induction on the derivation of the judgements. 
Lemma 10 (Free channels in conﬁgurations). If ;, p : S;C 	→ ′ and  does not contain Chan p and p : S ∈
′ then p occurs free in C.
Proof. Straightforward induction on the derivation of the judgement, using Lemma 9 for the case of C-Thread. 
Congruent conﬁgurations share the same typings. This result is used in the proof of Subject Reduction, rule R-Conf.
Lemma 11 (Subject congruence). If ;;C 	→ ′ and C ≡ C′ then ;;C′ 	→ ′.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the derivation of C ≡ C′. The inductive cases (the congruence rules) are
straightforward. We now consider the base cases.
Commutative monoid rules: There are three cases to consider.
• C′ = C | 〈unit 〉. From ;;C 	→ ′ we can build the derivation
;;C 	→ ′
C-Const
;′; unit 	→ ′;Unit ; ∅
C-Thread
;′; 〈unit 〉 	→ ′
C-Par
;;C | 〈unit 〉 	→ ′
The case C = C′ | 〈unit 〉 is direct from the above derivation tree.
• C = C1 | C2, and C′ = C2 | C1. Assume the derivation
;;C1 	→ 1 ;1;C2 	→ ′
C-Par
;;C1 | C2 	→ ′
From ;;C1 	→ 1, Lemma 4 gives 1 ⊆ , so that  = 1,′1 for some ′1; Lemma 7 gives ;′1 ;C1 	→
∅; Lemma 8 gives ;′,′1;C1 	→ ′. From ;1;C2 	→ ′, Lemma 8 gives ;1,′1;C2 	→ ′,′1, i.e.
;;C2 	→ ′,′1. Finally, rule C-Par gives ;;C2 | C1 	→ ′.• C = (C1 | C2) | C3 and C′ = C1 | (C2 | C3). The assumptions in a derivation of ;;C 	→ ′ are easily rearranged
to give a derivation of ;;C′ 	→ ′, and vice versa.
For the scope extrusion rules (S-ScopeN, S-ScopeC, and S-ScopeCN) we must consider each rule in both directions;
for S-ScopeC we must further consider two cases, depending on whether the typing derivation uses C-NewB or
C-NewC.
S-ScopeN: When reading the rule left-to-right we use variable weakening (Lemma 5). In the other direction we use
variable narrowing (Lemma 6). In both cases, we use the hypothesis (in the congruence rule) that x is not free in C2.
S-ScopeC, left-to-right, C-NewB: By hypothesis, we have
;, + : S, − : S;C1 	→ 1  not in ,,1
C-NewB
;; ()C1 	→ 1 ;1;C2 	→ ′
C-Par
;; ()C1 | C2 	→ ′
From the assumptions in the above tree, we build the following derivation. Because  is not in1, Lemma 4 guarantees
that it is not in ′.
;, + : S, − : S;C1 	→ 1 ;1;C2 	→ ′
C-Par
;, + : S, − : S;C1 | C2 	→ ′  not in ,,′
C-NewB
;; ()(C1 | C2) 	→ ′
S-ScopeC, left-to-right, C-NewC: Similar to the previous case.
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S-ScopeC, right-to-left, C-NewB: By hypothesis, we have a proof tree of the form:
;, + : S, − : S;C1 	→ 1 ;1;C2 	→ ′
C-Par
;, + : S, − : S;C1 | C2 	→ ′  not in ,,′
C-NewB
;; ()(C1 | C2) 	→ ′
We analyse the possibilities for whether or not + and − are in 1. There are three cases:
(1) +, − ∈ 1.
(2) +, − ∈ 1.
(3) + ∈ 1, − ∈ 1 (or symmetrically with the polarities exchanged).
In case 1 we build the following derivation:
;, + : S, − : S;C1 	→ 1  not in ,,1
C-NewB
;; ()C1 	→ 1 ;1;C2 	→ ′
C-Par
;; ()C1 | C2 	→ ′
In case 2, we have 1 = ′1, + : S, − : S and ;′1, + : S, − : S;C2 	→ ′. Because  is not in ′, Lemma 10
implies that + and − occur free in C2, contradicting the conditions of S-ScopeC. Therefore this case cannot arise.
In case 3, a similar analysis to case 2, with + only, shows that the case cannot arise.
S-ScopeC, right-to-left, C-NewC: Similar to case 1 of the previous argument.
S-ScopeCN: Straightforward. 
The following result allows to replace a given channel with another one, throughout a derivation tree. We use it in
Subject Reduction, for rule R-Init, to unify the two fresh channels in the hypothesis, and for rule R-Com, to unify the
sent channel with its name in the receiver.
Lemma 12 (Channel replacement). Suppose that p does not occur in any of ,,1,2, T , e, v, and that c does
not occur in :
(1) If , x : Chan c;, c : S; e 	→ 1; T ;2 then
, x : Chan p;, p : S; e{p/c} 	→ 1{p/c}; T {p/c};2{p/c}.
(2) If , x : Chan c; v 	→ T then , x : Chan p; v{p/c} 	→ T {p/c}.
Proof. The proof of the two results, by mutual induction on the derivation of the judgements, is straightforward. 
The following lemma accounts for all cases in Subject Reduction where substitution is needed, namely, in rules
R-App, R-Rec, and R-Beta.
Lemma 13 (Substitution). Suppose that ; v 	→ T .
(1) If , x : T ;; e 	→ 1;U ;2 then ;; e{v/x} 	→ 1;U ;2.
(2) If , x : T ; u 	→ U then ; u{v/x} 	→ U .
Proof. The proof of the two results is by mutual induction on the derivation of the judgement.
1. Expressions: The result follows easily using the result for values and induction.
2. Values: The cases of rules C-Const, C-Chan, and follow easily, observing that x does not occur in u, and applying
Lemma 6. The case of rule C-Var follows trivially, as u = x. The case of rule C-Abs uses the result for expressions,
and that of rule C-Rec follows by induction. 
We are ﬁnally in a position to prove Subject Reduction.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof proceeds by induction on the derivation of C → C′. We analyse each reduction rule
in Fig. 3, in turn.
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R-Init: By hypothesis, we have
〈let x = request n in t1〉 | 〈let y = accept n in t2〉 → ()(〈let x = + in t1〉 | 〈let y = − in t2〉)
where  is not free in t1, t2, and
 〈let x = request n in t1〉 | 〈let y = accept n in t2〉.
The only proof tree for this sequent is of the form
(1) (2)
C-Par
;; 〈let x = request n in t1〉 | 〈let y = accept n in t2〉 	→ 0
where (1) is the tree
; n 	→ [S] d1 fresh
;; request n 	→ ;Chan d1; d1 : S , x : Chan d1;, d1 : S; t1 	→ 2; T1;′2
;; let x = request n in t1 	→ 1; T1; ∅
C-Thread
;; 〈let x = request n in t1〉 	→ 1
and (2) is the tree
; n 	→ [S] d2 fresh
;1; accept n 	→ 1;Chan d2; d2 : S , y : Chan d2;1, d2 : S; t2 	→ 3; T2;′3
;1; let y = accept n in t2 	→ 0; T2; ∅
C-Thread
;1; 〈let y = accept n in t2〉 	→ 0
By examining the environments in the instances of C-Let in the above derivations, we obtain
1 =  ∩ 2
(d1 : S ∩ 2),′2 = ∅
0 = 1 ∩ 3
(d2 : S ∩ 3),′3 = ∅
and hence ′2 = ∅, ′3 = ∅, d1 ∈ 2, and d2 ∈ 3.
From the hypothesis , x : Chan d1;, d1 : S; t1 	→ 2; T1;′2 in (1) we use Lemma 12 to replace d1 by +, and
then weaken (Lemma 8) with − to obtain
, x : Chan +;, + : S, − : S; t1 	→ 2, − : S; T1; ∅
and so we can construct the derivation (1*) as follows, where we let ′ = , + : S, − : S and ′1 = 1, − : S:
C-Chan,C-Val
;′; + 	→ ′;Chan +; ∅ , x : Chan +;′; t1 	→ 2, − : S; T1; ∅
;′; let x = + in t1 	→ ′1; T1; ∅
C-Thread
;′; 〈let x = + in t1〉 	→ ′1
From the hypothesis , y : Chan d2;1, d2 : S; t2 	→ 3; T2;′3 in (1) we use Lemma 12 to replace d2 by − to
obtain
, y : Chan −;1, − : S; t2 	→ 3; T2; ∅
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and so we can construct the derivation (2*) as follows:
C-Chan,C-Val
;′1; − 	→ ′1;Chan −; ∅ , y : Chan −;, − : S; t2 	→ 3; T2; ∅
;′1; let y = − in t2 	→ 0; T2; ∅
C-Thread
;′1; 〈let y = − in t2〉 	→ 0
The following derivation completes this case:
(1*) (2*)
C-Par
;, + : S, − : S; 〈let x = + in t1〉 | 〈let y = − in t2〉 	→ 0
C-NewB
;; ()(〈let x = + in t1〉 | 〈let y = − in t2〉) 	→ 0
R-Com, sending a channel: By hypothesis, we have
〈let x = receive p in t1〉 | 〈let y = send 
 on p in t2〉 → 〈let x = 
 in t1〉 | 〈let y = unit in t2〉
The typing derivation is as follows:
(1) (2)
C-Par
;; 〈let x = receive p in t1〉 | 〈let y = send 
 on p in t2〉 	→ 0
where (1) is the tree
C-Chan
  p : Chan p
;; receive p 	→ 2;Chan d;3 , x : Chan d;2,3; t1 	→ 4; T1;5
;; let x = receive p in t1 	→ 1; T1; ∅
C-Thread
;; 〈let x = receive p in t1〉 	→ 1
and (2) is the tree
; 
 	→ Chan 
 ; p 	→ Chan p
;1; send 
 on p 	→ 6;Unit ;7 , y : Unit ;6,7; t2 	→ 8; T2;9
;1; let y = send 
 on p in t2 	→ 0; T2; ∅
C-Thread
;1; 〈let y = send 
 on p in t2〉 	→ 0
By analysing the rules used in (1) and (2), we can deduce more about the structure of the channel environments.
C-ReceiveS in (1) implies
 = ′, p : ?S.S1
2 = ′
3 = p : S1, d : S
C-Let in (1) implies
1 = 2 ∩ 4
(3 ∩ 4),5 = ∅
from which we conclude that 5 = ∅ and 3 ∩4 = ∅, and hence p ∈ 4 and d ∈ 4. By Lemma 4, 4 ⊆ (2,3),
so 4 ⊆ 2 and 1 = 4.
C-SendS in (2), together with the fact that  is balanced, implies
1 = ′1, p : !S.S1, 
 : S
6 = ′1
7 = p : S1
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C-Let in (2) implies
0 = 6 ∩ 8
(7 ∩ 8),9 = ∅
from which we conclude that 9 = ∅ and 7 ∩8 = ∅, and hence p ∈ 8. By Lemma 4, 8 ⊆ (6,7), so 8 ⊆ 6
and 0 = 8.
Since d is fresh, it is not in t1. Hence we can construct the derivation (1*), with the following instance of C-Let,
where we let ′′1 = ′1, p : S1:
C-Chan,C-Val
;1; 
 	→ 1;Chan 
; ∅ , x : Chan 
;1; t1 	→ ′′1; T1{
/d}; ∅
;1; let x = 
 in t1 	→ ′′1; T1{
/d}; ∅
Also we can construct the derivation (2*) with the following instance of C-Let:
C-Const,C-Val
;′′1; unit 	→ ′′1;Unit ; ∅ , y : Unit ;′′1; t2 	→ 0; T2; ∅
;′′1; let y = unit in t2 	→ 0; T2; ∅
From (1*) and (2*) we can construct a derivation of
;1; 〈let x = 
 in t1〉 | 〈let y = unit in t2〉 	→ 0
as required.
R-Com, sending a non-channel: Follows a pattern similar to, but simpler than, the one above.
R-Close: Similar to R-Com (non-channel).
R-New: By hypothesis, we have
〈let x = new S in t〉 → (n : [S])〈let x = n in t〉
and
C-New
;; new S 	→ ; [S]; ∅ , x : [S];; t 	→ ′; T ; ∅
C-Let
;; let x = new S in t 	→ ′; T ; ∅
C-Thread
;; 〈let x = new S in t〉 	→ ′
From the hypothesis in the above tree, we build a tree to complete the proof. Notice that, by the hypothesis of rule
R-New, n is not free in t. Thus, Lemma 5 is applicable to the premise of rule C-Let above, and hence,
C-Var,C-Val
, n : [S];; n 	→ ; [S]; ∅
, x : [S];; t 	→ ′; T ; ∅
Lemma 5
, n : [S], x : [S];; t 	→ ′; T ; ∅
C-Let
, n : [S];; let x = n in t 	→ ′; T ; ∅
C-Thread
, n : [S];; 〈let x = n in t〉 	→ ′
C-NewN
;; (n : [S])〈let x = n in t〉 	→ ′
R-Fork: By hypothesis, we have
〈fork t1; t2〉 → 〈t1〉 | 〈t2〉
and
;; t 	→ 1; T1; ∅ ;1; t ′ 	→ ′; T2; ∅
C-Fork
;; fork t; t ′ 	→ ′; T2; ∅
C-Thread
;; 〈fork t; t ′〉 	→ ′
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From the hypotheses in the above tree, we build a tree to complete the proof:
;; t 	→ 1; T1; ∅
C-Thread
;; 〈t〉 	→ 1
;1; t ′ 	→ ′; T2; ∅
C-Thread
;1; 〈t ′〉 	→ ′
C-Par
;; 〈t〉 | 〈t ′〉 	→ ′
R-App: By hypothesis, we have
〈let x = ((; y : T ).e)v in t〉 → 〈let x = e{v/y} in t〉
and
, y : T ;; e 	→ 1;U ;2
C-Abs
; (; y : T ).e 	→ (; T → U ;1,2) ; v 	→ T
C-App
;,′; ((; y : T ).e)v 	→ ′;U ;1,2 (1)
C-Let
;,′; let x = ((; y : T ).e)v in t 	→ ′ ∩ 3; T ′; ∅
C-Thread
;,′; 〈let x = ((; y : T ).e)v in t〉 	→ ′ ∩ 3
where (1) is the sequent , x : U ;′,1,2; t 	→ 3; T ′; ∅. Note that (1,2) ∩ 3 must be ∅, and so 1 ∩ 3 = ∅.
Then, one may build the following derivation to complete the proof:
; v 	→ T
, y : T ;; e 	→ 1;U ;2
Lemma 8
, y : T ;,′; e 	→ ′,1;U ;2
Lemma 13
;,′; e{v/y} 	→ ′,1;U ;2 (1)
C-Let
;,′; let x = e{v/y} in t 	→ (′,1) ∩ 3; T ′; ∅
C-Thread
	;,′; 〈let x = e{v/y} in t〉 	→ ′ ∩ 3
R-Rec: By hypothesis, we have
〈let x = (rec (y : T ).v)u in t〉 → 〈let x = (v{rec (y : T ).v/y})u in t〉
and making T = (; T ′ → U ;′), we also have
, y : T ; v 	→ T
C-Rec
; rec (y : T ).v 	→ T ; u 	→ T ′
C-App
;,′′; (rec (y : T ).v)u 	→ ′′;U ;′ (1)
C-Let
;,′′; let x = (rec (y : T ).v)u in t 	→ ′′ ∩ 1; T ; ∅
C-Thread
;,′′; 〈let x = (rec (y : T ).v)u in t〉 	→ ′′ ∩ 1
where (1) is , x : U ;′′,′; t 	→ 1; T ; ∅. Then, one may build the following derivation to complete the proof:
, y : T ; v 	→ T
C-Rec
; rec (y : T ).v 	→ T
Lemma 13
; v{rec (y : T ).v/y} 	→ T ; u 	→ T ′
C-App
;,′′; (v{rec (y : T ).v/y})u 	→ ′′;U ;′ (1)
C-Let
;,′′; let x = (v{rec (y : T ).v/y})u in t 	→ ,′′ ∩ 1; T ; ∅
C-Thread
;,′′; 〈let x = (v{rec (y : T ).v/y})u in t〉 	→ ,′′ ∩ 1
R-Beta: By hypothesis, we have
〈let x = v in t〉 → 〈t{v/x}〉
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and
; v 	→ T1
C-Val
;; v 	→ ; T1; ∅ , x : T1;; t 	→ 1; T2; ∅
C-Let
;; let x = v in t 	→ 1; T2; ∅
C-Thread
;; 〈let x = v in t〉 	→ 1
From the hypotheses of this derivation, Lemma 13 gives ;; t{v/x} 	→ 1; T2; ∅ and C-Thread gives ;; 	→
〈t{v/x}〉1 as required.
R-Let: A straightforward rearrangement of the derivation tree.
R-Branch: Follows the pattern in all the above cases.
R-NewC, R-NewN, R-Par, R-Cong: These cases follow directly by induction. For R-Cong, we use
Lemma 11. 
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 3, Type Safety
We start with three easy results.
Lemma 14. Suppose that 	;;C 	→ ′. Then,
(1) 	 is of the form x : [ S].
(2) If C is a -redex, then + : S and − : S are in  but not in ′.
(3) If C is a -thread, then for some p, p is in the domain of .
Proof. (1) Simple induction on the derivation tree of the sequent.
(2) A simple analysis of the possible derivation trees for the three possible -redex cases.
(3)A simple analysis of the conclusions of the last rule applied in the derivation of the sequent for -threads, namely
C-SendD, C-SendS, C-ReceiveD, C-ReceiveS, C-Case, C-Select, and C-Close. 
Then, for the main result of this section.
Proof of Theorem 3. By contradiction, assuming faulty conﬁgurations typable and performing a case analysis on the
possible forms of the faulty conﬁgurations.
Assume that C ≡ (x : T )()(C1 | C2), and that 	;;C 	→ ′ with  balanced. Build the only possible proof tree
for the above sequent, ﬁrst using rule C-NewN as many times as there are variables in x, then proceeding similarly with
rules C-NewB or C-NewC as many times as there are channels in , and ﬁnally with rule C-Par, to obtain a subtree
ending with the following sequent:
	′;′;C1 	→ _ (B.1)
where 	′ = 	, x : T , and ′ is , +1 : S1, −1 : S1, . . . , +r : Sr, −r : Sr , and channels 1, . . . r are part of , introduced
by rule C-NewB. Notice that 	 is of the form x : [ S], by Lemma 14.Also notice that ′ is balanced, since  is balanced
by hypothesis.
We now analyse each of the ﬁve possible classes of faulty conﬁgurations deﬁned in Section 6.
1. The three cases are similar. We analyse application. The only derivation tree for sequent (B.1) above is of the form
below:
	′; v 	→ (1; T1 → T2;2) · · ·
C-App
	′;′; v_ 	→ _; _; _ · · ·
C-Let
	′;′; let x = v_ in t 	→ _; _; _
C-Thread
	′;′; 〈let x = v_ in t〉 	→ _
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Analysing the rules for values (Fig. 5), one realizes that v can only be an abstraction or a recursive expression, for the
C-Var does not apply given the form of 	, and the type in the conclusion of the remaining rules (C-Const, C-Chan)
is not a functional type.
2. As above, analyse the lower part of the only proof tree for, say,
	′;′; 〈let x = accept v in t〉 	→ _
to obtain a tree for
	′; v 	→ [S].
Given the form of the type for v, among the rules for values, only C-Var applies. Hence, v is a variable.
3. As above, analyse the lower part of the only proof tree for, say,
	′;′; 〈let x = receive v in t〉 	→ _
to obtain a tree for
	′; v 	→ Chan p.
Once again, given the form of 	′, among the rules for values, only C-Chan applies. Then v can only be p.
4. There are several cases to check in this point; they are all similar. Pick, for example, the pair select/close , and
expand the lower part of the proof tree, until obtaining subtrees for the following two sequents,
	′;′; select l on p 	→ ′′; _; _ 	′;′′; close q 	→ _; _; _
Analysing the rule for select , one ﬁnds that p : 〈l : S〉 must be in ′. Similarly, analysing the rule for close one
realizes that q : End must be in′′. From Lemma 4, we know that′′ ⊆ ′, hence that p : 〈l : S〉, q : End is in′.
Then itmust be the case that q = p. But′ is balanced (and〈l : S〉 is not the dual ofEnd ), hence (x : T )()(C1 | C2)
is not typable.
5. We check the case for three -threads (〈t1〉 | 〈t2〉) | 〈t3〉, the others reduce to this. We have
	′;′; 〈t1〉 | 〈t2〉 	→ ′′ 	′;′′; 〈t3〉 	→ _
C-Par
	′;′; (〈t1〉 | 〈t2〉) | 〈t3〉 	→ _
If 〈t1〉 | 〈t2〉 is not a -redex, then we use case 4. Otherwise, by Lemma 14(2), it must be the case that + : S and − : S
are in ′ but not in ′′. With Lemma 14(3), this contradicts the assumption that 〈t3〉 is a -thread. 
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